How Liberal or Conservative are Democratic and Republican House Members

 Shortly after the end of the 88th Legislature's regular session, The Texas Tribune posted charts depicting the Democratic and Republican House members DW-Nominate scores for contested votes during the regular session. The charts indicate a liberal Democratic Party and a moderate Republican Party. Let's compare the two parties in terms of their members:

First, the Republican Party:

The Republicans range from conservative to somewhat liberal in their DW-Nominate scores. Any score greater than zero (a positive score) is conservative; any score less than zero (a negative score) is liberal.

The most conservative Republican is Jared Patterson at 0.454, followed by Briscoe Cain, Cody Vasut, Steve Toth, and Tony Tinderholt. The mean for all Republicans is -0.08, and the median is 0.00, which means that half of Republicans are above 0.00, and half are below 0.00. The most liberal Republican is J.M. Lozano at-0.61, followed by Morgan Meyer, Todd Hunter, Charlie Geren, and John Raney.

Second, the Democrats:

Democrats range from very liberal to somewhat liberal in terms of their DW-Nominate scores. The most liberal Democrat is Ana-Maria Ramos at -2.11, followed by Christina Morales, Gene Wu, Vikki Goodwin, and Jessica Gonzalez. The mean for Democrats is -1.56, and the median is -0.03. The least liberal Democrat is Richard Pena Ramond at -0.96, followed by Terry Canales, Tracy King, Oscar Longoria, and Bobby Guerra. 

The difference between the Republican mean and the Democratic mean is 1.48. There is no doubt that the two parties are polarized with Democrats more extreme than Republicans in terms of the members' DW-Nominate scores.   

The Meaning of Party ID in Contemporary Texas Politics

 One of the most important concepts in political science is party identification. As it was originally conceived, party identification (PID) was considered a psychological attachment to a political party. It was formed early and not likely to change. The parties were thought to represent different positions on public policy issues of the day. In a sense, it was a logical attachment to a set of ideas, or an ideology. However, both major parties in the United States were not sorted ideologically, since both parties contained liberals, moderates, and conservatives.

Currently, the conception of political parties is more a social identity rather than a shorthand for positions on public policies. The acquisition of party identification is also viewed differently. Party identification is not inherited from one's family; it is acquired through a series of social identities held by an individual. The figure demonstrates the process and its possible results:

As people have sorted based on social and ideological identities, partisan identification has become a social identity*, based on group affiliation rather than public policy issue positions. Partisanship as a social identity is affected by all of the psychological effects that are associated with group identity. An individual is more likely to take a hostile attitude toward members of the out-group and be biased towards members of the in-group. Members of the other political party are not just to be defeated in civil competition; they are to be eliminated because they are evil. Party competition is not a battle over ideas or public policy positions; it's a war to eliminate the competition. Winning is the goal. Politics is tribal: the in-group versus the out-group, a zero- sum game where a win by the out-group is a loss by the in-group. The opposition isn't legitimate, and its members are not human.

There are important implications of conceptualizing party identification as a social identity. Most importantly, the seven-category scale of party identification becomes unnecessary. If partisanship is a social identity, then there is no need to expand the three-category scale of party identification. Partisan leaning independents become unnecessary and even harmful in assessing party identification and political behavior. A person who considers themselves an independent will not have a partisan leaning. They may vote for a political party's candidate, but they cannot be considered a partisan. Emotionally, they have nothing in common with partisans. 

*There are many political scientists and journalists who see party identification as a social identity: Steven Greene, Donald Green, Larry Bartels, Bill Bishop, Shanto Iyengar, and Morris Fiorina. However, the conception is most fully developed by Lilliana Mason in Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity.

Partisan Change in Texas

 In Red State: An Insider's Story of How the GOP Came to Dominate Texas Politics, Wayne Thorburn describes the transition in Texas from a one-party Democratic state to a two-party state and ending as a one-party Republican state. The transition took decades, from the 1970s to the early 2000s. Over a thirty year span, Republicans came to control all of the statewide offices in Texas, a majority of the Texas congressional delegation, and both chambers of the Texas legislature. Thorburn identifies several factors in the 1970s and 1980s that assisted Republicans in dominating Texas politics and government: (1) John Tower’s senatorial victory in 1961 had consequences for Texas Republicans throughout the 1970s; (2) Liberal Democrats were effective in taking control of the Democratic Party during the 1980s and purging the party of conservative Democrats; (3)  the victory of Bill Clements in the 1978 gubernatorial election over John Hill, the liberal Democrat; and (4) the election of Ronald Reagan as the 40^th president of the United States.

To demonstrate the transition, Thorburn uses vote results from the following grouping of counties: Big Six, Suburban Counties, Metro Counties, and small city counties. The map depicts their location:

For some time, pundits have been predicting that the Democratic Party will regain its position as the dominant political party in Texas. Much of the prediction has been lodged in the increase of Hispanics in Texas. In 2022, according to the US Census Bureau, Hispanics became the largest ethnic group in Texas, surpassing non-Hispanic whites. Though Hispanics do not make up the majority of Texas’ population, they are a plurality of Texans.

To see how far (or not far) Democrats have progressed toward regaining the majority in Texas, let’s compare the votes of Texans in the gubernatorial election of 2022 with gubernatorial elections in the counties selected by Wayne Thorburn to measure the Republican rise to majority status.

The table depicts the 2022 gubernatorial election in the counties used by Thorburn.

Overall, in the 56 counties, Abbott garnered 837,583 votes to O’Rourke’s 603,502 votes, a difference of 234,081 votes. O’Rourke won the Big Six Counties by 601,124 votes. The only other grouping that O’Rourke won was the Travis County (Austin) and surrounding Suburban Counties. Abbott won the Dallas/Tarrant Counties Suburban Counties by 242,565 votes, the Harris County Suburban Counties by 181,356 votes, and the Bexar County Suburban Counties by 96,495 votes. Abbott won the Other Metro Counties by 317,167 votes.

The creation of the so-called “Red State” occurred largely during the 1986 to 1998 elections. We’ll look at the gubernatorial elections during that period through Thorburn’s data. We’ll also look at party identification (PID) during the period as another indicator of partisan change.

First, in 1978, Republican Bill Clements won his first term as governor, claiming the governorship of Texas for the first time in 105 years According to Thorburn, Clements’ victory was the result of winning the following groups of counties:

Year	Category						Statewide
	Big Six		Suburban		Other Metro
	Percent Republican	Vote Margin	Percent Republican	Vote Margin	Percent Republican	Vote Margin
1978	52.4	50,523	50.9	4,511	51.2	10,622	50.4
1994	51.3	52,089	59.9	146,114	58.4	51,959	53.8
2002	53.9	154,751	69.8	349,073	57.6	106,096	59.1
2006	49.4	-17,174	63.6	10,070	61.7	112,867	56.7
2010	47.7	-96,297	64.7	337,720	59.5	141,172	56.5
2014	48.8	-47,885	73.0	495,506	64.6	201,296	59.3
2018	44.3	-424,475	62.5	495,332	61.76	285,042	55.8
2022	41.3	-601,124	61.3	518,038	64.1	317,167	54.8

 Source: Thorburn, Red State, for Years 1978, 1994, 2002, 2006, and 2010. The author used data from the Texas Secretary of State’s election results for 2014-2022.

Obviously, the Republican percentage of the vote in the Big Six counties has declined since 2002, When Rick Perry won nearly 54 percent of the votes cast in the Big Six counties. Since the, the percentage of the vote for the Republican candidate for governor has declined each election, and the Democratic candidate’s margin has increased, reaching more than 600,000 votes in 2022. These counties are the primary target for further Democratic Party gains.

In the Suburban counties, Republicans hold a significant advantage over Democrats. After peaking at 73 percent of the gubernatorial vote in those counties, the percentage has declined, but the winning margin in votes has increased, reaching more than 518,000 votes in 2022. There are some counties where Democratic gubernatorial candidates can increase their share of the vote and reduce the Republican percentage of the vote as well as the margin of the vote.

In the Other Metro counties, Democrats lost support from these counties through several election cycles between 1986 and 1998, when Republicans won majorities in all of the selected counties. Since 1998, Republicans have won majorities in all six counties.

Here are the vote results for selected Other Metro counties:

There is not much hope for Democrats in these six counties.

In terms of party identification, we have polls since the 1960s that show how the once-dominant Democratic Party lost support to Republicans. In 2005, the Republicans held a commanding lead in party identification. Since 2005, however, party identification has settled to what is essentially a tie among party identifiers.

There are two distinct periods in which party identification shows the growth of Republican Party attachments and decline of Democratic Party affiliation. First, party identification from 1982 to 1990.

During the second period, 1991-2007 Republican Party identification increased, especially after 2000, and Democratic Party affiliation decreased. By 2005, 42 percent of Texas Registered voters identified with the Republican Party in Texas. Independents, people who profess no party affiliation, also grew during the period to become the largest segment of registered voters in 2007.

 

Since 2010, parity among Republican, Democratic, and independent identifiers has been the rule. In the June 2023, Texas Poll reported the following partisan attachments:

The second table shows that 34 percent of registered voters were either strong or weak Democratic Party identifiers, 37 percent were either strong or weak Republicans, and 29 percent were pure independents or independents who leaned toward the Republican Party or Democratic Party.[1]

Although there is no doubt that Republican candidates for partisan office hold a definite edge over Democratic candidates in statewide elections and a majority of US congressional districts, Texas House and Senate elections, partisan affiliations among registered voters only slightly favors the Republican Party. Among young voters—voters under 30 years of age, there is a distinct preference for claiming no partisan affiliation and voting for candidates on the basis of factors other than party identification.

 

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[1] I consider independents who lean toward one of the two parties to be independents. The Texas Poll consider leaners to be partisans and add them to the two parties’ identifiers. See PID 3 in the table.

 

Counties 34-71

 If you're reading this blog to understand voting in the 71 Texas counties that comprise 90 percent of the registered voters in Texas, and you're not depressed yet, then this post should do it for you. Or, like me, you could look for something positive that would mobilize you to make a difference in the 2024 general election.

Here are remaining counties. The picture is not pretty!

Of the 38 counties in this final group of Texas counties, Beto won only two counties (Maverick County and Starr County). Note that voter turnout in those counties was extremely low; only 28 percent of the registered voters participated in Maverick County and only 32 percent in Starr County. Overall, Abbott won the 38 counties by a margin of 450,054 votes, garnering more than three out of every four votes cast. 

Unfortunately, being realistic is necessary when analyzing Democratic prospects in these counties. The only optimism can be found in the possibilities in Bastrop County, where Beto received nearly 42 percent of the vote, and voter turnout exceeded one-half of the registered voters in the county.

Texas Counties 11-33

 As we consider the second group of Texas counties, we should note that Democratic Party candidate Beto O'Rourke won only four of the 23 counties. Overall, Beto lost this set of counties by 483,219 votes. On the other hand, Governor Abbott won 63.6 percent of the two-party vote in the counties.

 

What do the counties that Beto won indicate for what Democrats can do in 2024 to garner more votes? First, note that voter turnout is extremely low in three (Webb, Hidalgo, and Cameron Counties) of the four counties, averaging 33.5 percent of the vote. In the county that Beto won with the highest percentage of the vote (Webb County), voter turnout was a paltry 31.1 percent of registered voters. Only Hays County featured turnout that exceeded half of the registered voters. Obviously, voter turnout among Democratic Party identifiers who did not vote is the highest priority.

Second, among the counties that Abbott won, I would largely ignore those counties where he won with 65 to 80 percent of the two-party vote. I think that there are certain counties among this group that should be engaged. For example, Bell County, Brazoria County, and Nueces Counties provide an opportunity to expand the Democratic Party vote in 2024. I would hope that Democrats devote some money and organization to assisting Democratic Candidates in those counties. Montgomery County, because of its proximity to Harris County, might be considered for additional efforts to mobilize Democrats.

Third, I would expend little to no effort in the counties where Abbott earned more than 80 percent of the vote. There are probably few Democrats there to mobilize. 

 

Texas Counties 1-10

 Yesterday, I provided data on 71 Texas counties that comprise 90 percent of the total registered voters in Texas.

Today, we'll look at the 10 Texas counties with the largest number of registered voters in terms of votes cast in the 2022 Texas gubernatorial election. There are some caveats about the information. First, I used the January 2023 registration figures from the Texas Secretary of State's Web site. The vote for gubernatorial candidates includes only the vote for Republican Greg Abbott and Democrat Beto O'Rourke. There were, of course, votes for others, but the number was insignificant. If you have questions about the sources, let me know. Second, the vote totals are from the Texas Secretary of State's office and are the canvassed vote totals. Third, voter turnout in Texas was disappointing. Here are the results:

Notice that the largest segment, more than 9.5 million Texans, were registered voters who did not vote. Aso, another 1.3 million Texans, who were otherwise eligible to vote, were not registered to vote. Overall, only 45.85 percent of registered Texas voters voted.

So, how did Governor Abbott and challenger O'Rourke do  among the voters in Texas' 10 counties with the largest number of registered voters?

The table tells the story.

There are several important takeaways. First, O'Rourke outpolled Abbott by 534,618 votes, winning nearly 56 percent of the two-party vote. O'Rourke's percentage of the two-party vote was highest in Travis County, where he won almost three-fourths of the vote (73.8 percent). In addition, O'Rourke carried Harris, Dallas, Bexar, Fort Bend, and El Paso Counties with a majority of the two-party vote. O'Rourke's percentage of the two-party vote was lowest in Denton County and Collin County, where he won only 43.5 percent and 44.9 percent respectively. 

Second, there are important lessons for counties to learn from Travis County's efforts to mobilize voters. Several pro-Democratic Party groups, in addition to the Travis County Democratic Party, made an extensive effort to identify Democratic Party voters, especially those who are less likely to vote in midterm elections, contact them either through canvassing or social media, and get them to the polls. Organizing at the precinct level is essental to electoral success. Training with groups involved with social media, such as 2 Million Texans, and groups that canvass with neighborhood residents as volunteers can increase Democratic turnout significantly. These efforts, however, require committed volunteers, training, and oversight to ensure that the right people are mobilized. 

Third, the meme that Texas isn't a Red State, it's a non-voting state is true. Travis County shows the way. Adopt their methods and make the other large Texas counties mirror their performance in the 2024 General Election. It should have started by now, or really several months ago.

In a Facebook post, Chris Tackett noted the population of Texas' 254 counties and their voting tendencies. Building on the idea, I created a list of Texas counties with more than 30,000 registered voters (January 2023, Texas Secretary of State). These 71 Texas counties comprise 90.68 percent of the total registered voters in Texas.

Here are the counties, their registered voters, and the percentage that the county provides to the total number of registered voters in Texas.

But the number is not equally distributed among the counties. Here’s the distribution:

Eighty-one percent of Texas' registered voters are living in just 33 of Texas’ 254 counties. These are the counties where registered non-voters who share Democratic Party tendencies need to be (1) identified, (2) contacted personally, and (3) led (motivated) to vote. It can be done. It should have been started yesterday, and in some counties and some precincts, it is being done.

You can do it.

 

State and Local Tax Structures

 The following information is from the ITEP's latest study: Who Pays? 6th Edition – State-by-State Data – ITEP

No state and local tax structure is progressive, but some states have a less regressive tax structure than other states.

What makes a state's tax structure less regressive?

Here's what the report indicates:

A state's tax structure is the method of receiving the funds necessary to provide the state's services. 

How much is contributed to the state's coffers is important but who contributes is just as, if not more, important.

Pick a state, go to the report by the ITEP, find the state's tax structure, and analyze it. What changes, if any, would you make to the structure?